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Abstract— Wireless networks have gained overwhelming pop-
ularity over their wired counterpart due to their great flexibility
and convenience, but access control of wireless networks has
been a serious problem because of the open medium. Passwords
remain the most popular way for access control as well as
authentication and key exchange. But existing password-based
access control protocols are not satisfactory in that they do not
provide DoS-resistance or anonymity. In this paper we analyze
the weaknesses of an access control protocol using passwords for
wireless networks in IEEE LCN 2001, and propose a different
access control protocol using passwords for wireless networks.
Our new protocol avoids the weaknesses of the previous protocol,
and the client can anonymously authenticate himself to the server
with a human-memorable password, while the server is free of
DoS attacks. We also present detailed security and performance
analysis for our protocols, and show that our protocol is both
secure and efficient for access control in wireless networks.
Wireless Networks, Security Protocol, Access Control
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of great convenience and flexibility provided by
wireless networks, the popularity of wireless networks has
surged dramatically over the recent few years. This also
leads to the increasing pervasiveness of wireless technologies,
such as IEEE 802.11, HomeRF, HIPERLAN/2 and Bluetooth.
Though wireless networks offer great benefits, they are more
susceptible to attacks and require more protection than their
wired counterpart. In wireless networks, data is broadcast in
the open air, and it is impossible to have physical controls
over the transmission boundaries. That makes eavesdropping
or active attacks more easily than in wired networks, and hence
security becomes the major concern in wireless networking.
Since deployment of wireless network technologies in public
places bears the danger of unauthorized users gaining access
to network services, it is extremely crucial to be able to restrict
access to the network only to authorized users. Therefore,
secure user authentication and authorization, and a reliable
access control mechanism are vital for wireless networks.
Human-memorable passwords have been widely used for
authentication and key exchange due to their user friendliness.
Hence it is desirable to use shared passwords to achieve
access control in wireless networks. The authentication and
key exchange protocols that use weak passwords, known as
the password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols,
have been well investigated in the literature. However, existing
PAKE protocols fail to provide client identity confidentiality
and DoS-resistance for wireless networks.
In wireless environment, there is an important requirement
on confidentiality protection of a client’s identity, which has
been neglected in many solutions for wireless networks. In
wireless networks, the current location and the movement of
a roaming user are important parts of the user’s privacy, and
they should be protected during communications. Knowing the
user’s identity helps the attacker to locate the user and track
his movement, so it is important for a protocol to provide
identity confidentiality to users in a wireless environment. In
PAKE protocols, the client needs to disclose its identity so that
the server knows which password is used for authentication
and key exchange. Consequently, client identity confidentiality
cannot be achieved with PAKE protocols.
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a serious threat against
availability of network services, and it is exceedingly dif-
ficult to counter against such attacks in wireless networks.
Wireless networks are extremely vulnerable to DoS attacks
because of its unique characteristics. In wireless networks,
both passive attacks and active attacks can be launched easily
since data transmission happens in the open air. Moreover,
wireless networks usually has limited bandwidth, power and
computation capability, and hence they are more susceptible to
DoS attacks. But PAKE protocols have no built-in mechanism
to counter against DoS attacks. In PAKE protocols, the server
can only authenticate the client after expensive computation,
which results in vulnerability against DoS attacks.
In this paper, we review an access control protocol proposed
called Lancaster protocol in IEEE LCN 2001 [22], and analyze
its weaknesses and design flaws. Besides the password shared
between the server and each client, this protocol additionally
requires the server has a certificate issued by a well-known
authority. Under the same setting, Then we propose a new
protocol using human-memorable passwords for access control
in wireless networks. Our protocol avoids the weaknesses
and design flaws of the Lancaster protocol, and offers two
more important features for wireless networks : client identity
confidentiality and resistance against DoS attacks.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we first review related work on security protocols
for wireless networks; we then analyze the Lancaster protocol,
and present a new protocol that can achieve DoS-resistance
and identity confidentiality for wireless networks in section
III. After that, we discuss and analyze the security and
performance of our protocol. Finally, we draw our concluding
remarks in Section IV.
For ease of reference, important notations used throughout
the paper are listed in the following table I:
TABLE I
NOTATION
C The client
S The authentication server
EX(M) Message M encrypted with X’s public key
eK(M) Symmetric key encryption of a message M using
K as the encryption key
Hk(·) Cryptographically secure one-way keyed hash
function
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a lot of research efforts on access control
and authentication protocols, and some of them are specially
designed for wireless networks. Unfortunately, they either can-
not fulfill all the security requirements of wireless networks,
or need each client has his own PKI certificate, which is too
heavy a burden for most organizations.
The IEEE standard 802.11 [17] has used the Wired Equiva-
lent Privacy (WEP) protocol, which is a symmetric cryptosys-
tem based protocol, for access control in wireless networks.
WEP is intended to protect wireless communication from
eavesdropping as well as preventing unauthorized access to
wireless networks. It replies on a shared secret between the
mobile station and the access point to achieve the aforemen-
tioned goals. However, it has been indicated that WEP has
serious design flaws that make WEP vulnerable against both
passive and active attacks [2], [6].
To solve the above security problems, IEEE specifies the
802.11i standard [19] to enhance the security of 802.11. In the
802.11i standard, a long term security architecture for 802.11
called the Robust Security Network (RSN) and the Robust
Security Network Association (RSNA) are defined for wireless
networks. RSNA uses the IEEE 802.1X standard [18] to
enhance access control, authentication, key management, and
key establishment mechanisms for 802.11. In IEEE 802.1X
standard, EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) is used
for authentication and key establishment. Although it has
been pointed out that the 802.1X protocol is vulnerable to
the session hijacking attack and the man-in-the-middle attack
[16], these problems do not exist when security protocols
that provide strong mutual authentication over EAP is used
between access points and mobile stations.
EAP, which is defined in RFC 2284, is a flexible protocol
used to carry arbitrary authentication information. It provides
flexible and extensibility for authentication by defining an
independent message exchange layer. A set of IETF drafts
have defined different security protocols over EAP: EAP-TLS,
EAP-TTLS (Tunneled TLS), PEAP (Protected EAP), LEAP
(Lighweight EAP) etc. However, each protocol of them has its
own drawbacks. LEAP is an enhanced version from EAP-MD5
which is insecure against dictionary attacks, which results in
insecurity of LEAP against dictionary attacks too. EAP-TLS
replies on certificates on both the server and the client side to
deliver mutual authentication and secure key exchange, which
is too great a barrier for most organizations to overcome. EAP-
TTLS and PEAP are developed to overcome the PKI barrier
in EAP-TLS. Both protocols only require the server certificate
to establish a TLS tunnel in stage one, and then authenticate
each other in stage two. But they are susceptible to DoS
attacks because the server requires to compute a signature on
authentication request of any entity. Moreover, client identity
confidentiality is not provided in EAP-TLS, LEAP and PEAP.
Several EAP methods using weak passwords also have
been proposed as IETF drafts, such as EAP-PAX, EAP-SRP,
and EAP-SPEKE. The protocols using only weak passwords
for authentication and key exchange, known as the PAKE
protocols, have gained extensive attention and research in-
terests until now. The IEEE P1363 Standard Working Group
is engaged in standardization on password-based public-key
cryptographic protocols, including SPEKE [12], SRP [25],
PAK [20] and AMP [15]. The main disadvantages of pure
PAKE protocols are their incapability of client identity protec-
tion and susceptibility against DoS attacks, and hence they are
not suitable for access control in wireless networks. In PAKE
protocols, the client requires to disclose his identity to the
server so that the server knows which password should be used
for authentication. As a result, such protocols cannot provide
identity confidentiality for clients. On the other hand, in such
protocols the server can only authenticate the client after
expensive computation. This causes the protocols susceptible
to DoS attacks, since anyone can send requests to launch the
server into computational expensive operations.
Unlike the pure PAKE protocols, the EAP-PAX protocol can
provide client identity confidentiality when the server holds a
certificate, which is the same with our protocol. However, it
has several design flaws and cannot meet all requirements of
wireless networks. First of all, it is vulnerable to dictionary
attacks during its registration phase if the server does not have
a certificate. Besides, the protocol replaces the weak password
on both the server and the client side with a generated random
secret on each update. As a result, the protocol doesn’t obtain
convenience of using human-memorable passwords in later
authentication. Furthermore, the protocol is susceptible to DoS
attacks since any part can trick the server into expensive public
key cryptographic decryption.
Many other public key cryptosystem based protocols have
also been proposed for authentication in wireless networks, but
they usually fall short of one or more requirements. The Beller-
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Chang-Yacobi protocol [4] and the Aziz-Diffie protocol [3] do
not provide client identity confidentiality, while the Boyd-Park
protocol [9] do not obtain perfect forward secrecy. Though the
ASPeCT protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and client
identity confidentiality, but it is susceptible to DoS attacks.
The Just Fast Keying (JFK) protocol [11] specified in the
Internet draft provides immunity to DoS attacks and identity
confidentiality for clients, but it requires certificates on the
client end which is too big a hurdle to deal with. Another
Internet draft specified the Internet Key Exchange protocol
(IKEv2) [13] also has such a PKI barrier problem that makes
it undesirable to be used in wireless networks.
III. ACCESS CONTROL PROTOCOLS FOR WIRELESS
NETWORKS
In this section, we first review the Lancaster access control
protocol proposed in IEEE LCN 2001 [22], [10] and discuss its
security weaknesses. Then we introduce a new access control
protocol for access control in wireless networks. Both the
Lancaster protocol and our protocol has the same system setup:
a client shares a password with a server, while the server has
a certificate issued by a well-known authority.
The authentication of WLAN is based on a 3-party model
as shown in Fig. 1: the client, which requires access to the
WLAN; the access router, which grants access to the client;
and the authentication server, which authenticates the client
and gives permission to the client. If the client intends to ac-
cess the wireless network, he requires to mutually authenticate
with the authentication server and agrees on a session key
with the server. After that, the session key is transmitted to
the access router for the purpose of access control.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the Wireless Networks
A. System Settings and Security Requirements
The system settings of the protocols are as follows: the
authentication server and the client share a weak (low-entropy)
password, and such a password is susceptible to dictionary
attacks. Meanwhile, the authentication server has a certificate
issued by a well-known authority. We assume that the adver-
sary has complete control of the wireless network, and he has
reasonable computation capability. He can eavesdrop, drop,
modify, inject, delay and replay messages transmitted over the
wireless link.
We list below a number of security requirements for such
protocols.
• Mutual Authentication: Authentication of the client to
the authentication server and authentication of the server
to the client. The network want to be sure that it is
communicating with a genuine client; otherwise there is
a danger that spurious client will be able to fraudulently
gain a level of service without ever intending to pay for
the service. Authentication of the authentication server to
the client is also necessary in order to prevent a type of
man-in-the-middle attack as described in [16].
• Key Authentication and Key Confirmation: Key authen-
tication requires that only the legitimate participants in
the protocol but no other entity possess the agreed secret
key, while key confirmation means that both parties in
the protocol can be assured that both of them derive the
same secret key.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy: Previous session keys and confi-
dential messages should be protected against compromise
of the passwords and other long-term secrets.
• Secure Against Dictionary Attacks: Since passwords must
be memorable, a secure password based protocol should
resist brute-force guessing, or dictionary attacks.
• Client Identity Confidentiality: Confidentiality protection
of a client’s identity against both passive and active
attacks. In the wireless environment, the current location
and the movement of a roaming user are important parts
of the user’s privacy, and they should be protected during
communications. Knowing the user’s identity helps the
attacker to locate the user and track his movement, so it
is important for a protocol in a wireless environment to
provide identity confidentiality to users.
• Protection Against DoS Attacks: The protocol should
have certain built-in remedies to reduce the effect of DoS
attacks aiming to exhaust the server’s computation re-
source (computation-DoS) or storage resource (memory-
DoS).
• Access Control: Only authorized clients can obtain access
to the wireless network. To protect from the parking lot
attacks [2], fine grained access control, ideally on a per
packet level, should be enforced.
B. The Lancaster Access Control Protocol
The Lancaster access control architecture [22], [10] is for
publicly accessible wireless overlay networks. It is designed
to address the problem of ubiquitous Internet service provi-
sioning within the city of Lancaster. As illustrated in Fig. 2,
it consists of three messages.
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1) To access the network, a client initiates the process by
sending an authentication request to the authentication
server via an access router:
ES(MACC , IPC ,K, Username, Password) (A.1)
where MACC , IPC , Username and Password are
the client’s MAC address, IP address, username and
password, respectively, and K is a secret session key
generated by the client. This request is encrypted with
the public key of the authentication server.
2) Upon receiving the authentication request, the authenti-
cation server decrypts it using its private key. It checks
the received password with the one in its database. If the
two passwords match, the client is considered authentic.
The authentication server then generates an authentica-
tion token Token, encrypts it using the session key K
and sends the ciphertext to the client:
eK(Token) (A.2)
3) Next, the authentication server encrypts the client’s
MAC address, IP address, the access token and the
session key with the access router’s public key, and sends
the result to the access router:
EAR(K,Token,MACC , IPC) (A.3)
The access router decrypts this message and stores
MACC , IPC , Token and K into an access control list
(ACL).
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Fig. 2. The Lancaster Protocol.
When the client sends a packet to the network, it includes an
access control extension header in the IP packet as illustrated
in Fig. 3. This header contains the access token and a check-
sum both encrypted with the session key K using a symmetric
key cipher. In Fig. 3, V denotes the protocol version, T denotes
the type of services, and Res denotes the reserved bits.
The access router checks packets from the clients (i.e.,
the wireless network) for purpose of access control. When
a packet is received from the wireless network, the access
router looks up the MAC address in the ACL. If an entry
for the client device exists, the access router verifies the IP
source address. In the case of a match, it decrypts the access
token and the checksum using the session key and validates its
content against the ACL. When successful, the access control
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Fig. 3. The Packet Header Format in the Lancaster Protocol.
extension header is stripped off and the packet is passed on.
Packets that fails any of those tests are dropped. One exception
to this rule is that when a client is first seen in a cell, it is
allowed to contact certain well-known IP addresses; this allows
clients to initially communicate with the authentication server.
The Lancaster protocol is simple in design, with only two
message exchanges between a client and the authentication
server and one message sent from the authentication server to
an access router. Unfortunately, it has many serious security
flaws which make it vulnerable to various attacks.
First of all, the protocol does not follow the well-known
“challenge-response” principle. Specifically, message (A.1) is
not sent in response to any challenge from the authentication
server. This makes the protocol subject to the replay attacks.
Obviously, message (A.1) can be replayed by anyone to the
authentication server and the server will accept the message
and believes the sender as authentic.
Secondly, if the attacker is able to compromise just one
session key K, he can gain full access to the wireless
network. The attacker can replay message (A.1) to request
authentication, and then with the knowledge of the session
key the attacker can obtain the access token by decrypting
message (A.2). Employing techniques of IP spoofing and MAC
spoofing, the attacker can then gain full access to the wireless
network with the access token. The attacker can perform this
attack any time he wishes to with the knowledge of just one
session key even he does not know the client password at all.
Thirdly, since the password space is normally small, the
attacker can perform dictionary attacks against message (A.1)
if any session key is exposed to the attacker. And this attack
can disclose the client’s password.
Finally, the protocol does not provide key confirmation for
both parties. Neither party is ensured that the other party
shares the same secret session key. In message (A.2), Token
is selected and encrypted with K by the server, hence the
client is unable to confirm that they share the same session
key K. Also, key freshness is not guaranteed in the protocol.
There is no mechanism to prevent reuse of old session keys.
If the client reuses a previously used session key, the server
will simply accept this old key. This leads to the failure of the
protocol when only one session key is compromised.
Moreover, the technical details of the access control ex-
tension header shown in Fig. 3 is not clearly spelled out in
[22], [10]. Since the client and the access router share a secret
session key K, the use of the access token is not clear. We
note that the combined use of checksum and symmetric key
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encryption as in the Lancaster protocol is dangerous if not
designed carefully [5], [6]. The description on the construction
of the access control extension header in [22], [10] does not
provide enough technical details for us to make creditable
analysis.
C. Our Access Control Protocol
As discussed earlier, the intrinsic characteristics of PAKE
protocols lead to their incapability of providing client identity
protection and susceptibility against DoS attacks. In this sec-
tion, we propose a secure protocol to meet all the requirements.
Before the protocol starts, the client and the server agree
on a set of security parameters: a multiplicative group Z∗p, its
subgroup Gp,q of order q and a generator g of Gp,q , where
p, q are large prime numbers. Specifically, p is selected as a
safe prime or a secure prime, which means that p = 2q+1 or
p = 2qr + 1 where all the factors of r are comparable to q.
Assuming that discrete logarithm problem over Gp,q is hard.
Before a client can access network services, it performs
the following authentication and key agreement with the
authentication server. The protocol message exchanges are
illustrated in Fig 4.
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Fig. 4. Our Anonymous DoS-Resistant Access Control Protocol.
1) The client C chooses a random number x ∈R Zq
and computes the exponential (gx)P encrypted with its
password. Then he sends
(gx)P (B.1)
to the server, where C is the identity of the client. Since
the exponential gx is randomly generated, dictionary at-
tacks are not applicable to disclose the client’s password.
2) After the server receives the first message, he chooses
a random number y ∈R Zq and the exponential gy . He
computes a hash HHK(gy, (gx)P ) with a hash key HK
private to the server only. Then the server sends
S, gy, (gx)P ,HHK(gy, (gx)P ) (B.2)
to the client.
In this step, the server should avoid expensive com-
putation in order to resist DoS attacks, because the
server cannot determine whether the client is valid.
Actually the computation cost of the server includes an
exponentiation and a hash computation in this message.
But the server can generate the random exponential
beforehand or periodically, so that the computation cost
of the server is only a light-weight hash computation.
In this message, HK is a hash key known only by the
server, and it is updated frequently to prevent accidental
disclosure. As a result, the hash HHK(gy, (gx)P ) can
serve as an authenticator and a cookie that would be
sent back by the client in the next message.
3) After the client receives the above message, he computes
the session key k = H(C|S|gxy) and then a hash
Hk(gy, (gx)P ). Then he fetches the server’s public key
to encrypt his identity C, his MAC address MACC , a
random nonce NC , and the hash, and then he sends
gy, (gx)P ,HHK(gy, (gx)P ),
ES{C,MACC , NC ,Hk(gy, (gx)P )} (B.3)
to the server.
In this step, the client derives the session key
k by Diffie-Hellman computation, which provides
perfect forward secrecy for the protocol. The hash
HHK(gy, (gx)P ) which serves as an authenticator as
well as the two exponentials is sent back to the server
so that the server does not need to store the two
exponentials but still can verify that the two exponentials
are not modified by checking the hash. Hence the server
can resist DoS attacks that intend to deplete the server’s
storage space. The client’s identity is protected with the
server’s public key to avoid identity disclosure.
4) After the server receives the above message, it verifies
the validity of the hash HHK(gy, (gx)P ) by look-
ing up the hash value in its storage. If the hash
value is stored on the server, then the server can
verifies whether the two exponentials are valid by
checking the received hash. After that, the server de-
crypts ES(C,MACC , NC ,Hk(gy, (gx)P )) and fetch
the client’s password according to his identity. The
server now can decrypts (gx)P to obtain gx and com-
putes the session key k in the same way as the client.
At the end, the server assigns an IP address IPC to the
client and sends the following message to the client.
ek(C,S, IPC , gy, (gx)P ) (B.4)
In order for access control at the access point, the
server also sends the session key k, the client’s MAC
address and IP address to the access point through a
secure channel.
After successful authentication and key agreement, the
enforcement of access control in our protocol uses an access
control extension header. Specifically, we follow the approach
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of the Authentication Header in IPSec [14]. Our access control
extension header is shown in Fig.5, where the Integrity Check
Value (ICV) is a keyed hash function output given by
ICV = Hk(MACHeader||IPv6Header||
V ||T ||Res||Payload).
Here V denotes protocol version, T denotes the type of
service, and Res denotes the reserved bits.
The ICV is computed by the client C for every IP packet
it sends to the network, and this provides integrity and data
origin authentication for the IP packet. It can also be used to
provide protection against replays by incorporating a sequence
number in the extension header [14].
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Fig. 5. The Packet Header Format in Our Protocol.
When an IP packet is received from the wireless network,
the access router looks up the MAC address in the ACL. If
the entry exists for the client device, the access router fetches
the secret session key, computes the ICV over the appropriate
fields of the received packet, using the same formula as the
client, and verifies that it is the same as the ICV included in
the received packet. If the verification is successful, the access
control extension header containing the ICV is stripped off
and the packet is passed on; otherwise, the packet is dropped
silently.
D. Security Analysis of Our Protocol
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol and
show that our protocol fulfills all the requirements aforemen-
tioned, including client identity confidentiality and resistance
to DoS attacks.
Mutual authentication between the client and the server
is achieved after a successful protocol execution. The server
authenticates the client by verifying the hash Hk(gy, (gx)P )
encrypted with the server’s public key in message (B.3), since
only the legitimate client knows x and can compute the session
key k. On the other hand, because only the valid server can
decrypt the ciphertext in message (B.3) and know the client’s
identity, the client can authenticate the server by checking
message (B.4). At the same time, both parties are ensured
that the other party obtains the same session k as himself.
Our protocol provides perfect forward secrecy by employing
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and this ensures security of pre-
vious sessions even when the shared password or the server’s
private key is compromised. With the secret password P , an
adversary who has stored previous communication content can
decrypt (gx)P from previous session. If the server’s private
key is compromised, the adversary can discover the client’s
identity. But in both cases, it is still computationally infeasible
for the adversary to obtain k assuming the hardness of discrete
logarithm. So the adversary still cannot derive the session key
and in turn cannot disclose previous communication.
In our protocol, the identity of the client is protected
against both passive and active attacks. After the client receives
message (B.2), it fetches the public key of the server according
to the server’s identity, and sends its identity encrypted by the
server’s public key. Hence only the valid server who holds
the corresponding private key can decrypt it to obtain the
client’s identity. Later in message (B.4), the client’s identity
is protected with the session key k. Since a passive attacker
cannot complete Diffie-Hellman computation to derive k, he
cannot obtain any information about the client’s identity. On
the other hand, an active attacker has no legitimate private
key to decrypt the identity information in message (B.3),
and he cannot complete Diffie-Hellman exchange to derive
k to decrypt message (B.4) either. Therefore, both passive and
active attacks cannot disclose the client’s identity.
The shared password is secure against off-line dictionary
attacks in our protocol. In the protocol, the password is used to
encrypt the random exponential gx generated by the client, and
hence an adversary cannot verify his guess because he does not
know gx. If the adversary impersonates as the server, and sends
an exponential gy′ to the client. The client then will derive the
session key k′ = H(C|S|gxy′), which can be computed by the
adversary who has y′. However, the adversary cannot verify
his guess by checking ES{C,MACC , NC ,Hk(gy, (gx)P )}
because NC is a random nonce chosen by the client.
The server does not have to keep any state and commit any
storage when sending out message (B.2), and this relieves the
server from memory DoS attacks that intend to exhaust the
server’s memory. The two exponentials will be sent back in
message (B.3), so the server does not need to create state and
store these information. So if the client is fraudulent, the server
will not have committed any storage resources. In order to
avoid the case in which the exponentials may be modified, the
server uses a secret hash key HK to compute an authenticator
HHK(gy, (gx)P ). The key HK is private to the server and is
updated frequently, and the authenticator sent back in message
(B.3) can be used to ensure that the exponentials are the
same as those in (B.2). On the other hand, the server is also
protected from computation DoS attacks aiming to exhaust the
server’s computation resource. In message (B.2), the server’s
computation cost includes only a cryptographic hash operation
and an exponential gy . Note that the random exponential gy
can be computed beforehand or periodically computed when
the server is lightly computational burdened. Moreover, when
the server is under the computation DoS attack and heavily
burdened in computation, the server can reuse previously used
exponential gy . While if the adversary launches a computation
DoS attack by flooding message (B.3) to the server, the server
just resends message (B.4) to the other party.
Only the authorized client who has the valid password P
can establish a secret key K with the authentication server and
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in turn with an access router. Since only the client with K
can compute ICV for an IP packet, only the client can access
the network services. Note that the ICV is computed over the
MAC header and the entire IP packet; hence, any modification
to the MAC header and the IP packet during transmission
will be detected by the access router. This ensures that only
authorized parties can gain access to the wireless network.
E. Performance Evaluation of Our Protocol
Compared with other protocols for access control in wireless
networks, our protocol fulfills all the security requirements
while not requiring certificates on the client end. A comparison
between our protocol and other protocols is given in the
table II. Only our protocol, the JFK protocol and the IKEv2
protocol provides both DoS resistance, but JFK and IKEv2
require certificates on the client end which is a big hurdle
for implementation. Although EAP-TTLS, PEAP, LEAP, and
EAP-PAX do not require client certificates, but they are
vulnerable to DoS attacks. Moreover, LEAP and EAP-PAX
are susceptible to dictionary attacks.
While providing desirable features for wireless networks,
our protocol also achieves great computation efficiency for
wireless networks. In our protocol, the server only needs 2
exponentiations and 1 public key decryption, and the client
requires to compute 2 exponentiations and 1 public key
encryption. We evaluate the performance of our protocol by
measuring the overhead of our protocol. The overhead incurred
by our access control protocol consists of two parts. The
first part of the overhead comes from authentication and
key exchange of the protocol. Before a client can access
the wireless network, it needs to follow the protocol with
the authentication server to agree on a session key for each
session. This part of overhead is associated with every session.
Thereafter, the client uses the session key to encrypt and
authenticate every packet, while the access router verifies every
packet from the client with the same session key. The delay of
the packet processing leads to the second part of the overhead
for the wireless network, and it is associated with every packet.
We adopt the benchmarks for the cryptographic operations
on two different hardware platforms. One is a 450MHz Pen-
tium III processor [23], [1], [21], and the other is a 2.1GHz
Pentium IV processor [24]. We assume the following system
setup for performance evaluation of our protocol: AES is used
for encryption and HMAC/MD5 is used for ICV calculation;
the bandwidth of the wireless network is 1Mb/s; the random
nonces NC and NS , the exponents, the identity of each party
are 160-bit long; the modulus p is 1,024-bit long.
For the first part of the overhead, the time on hash compu-
tation, random number generation, modular multiplication and
modular inversion can be ignored, since it is relatively much
smaller than the time on Diffie-Hellman key-pair generation
and key agreement.
After successful authentication and key exchange, the client
obtains the session key to secure its subsequent communica-
tions. With the session key, every packet is encrypted and an
integrity check value (ICV) of the packet is calculated for the
purpose of authentication. After the packet is received by the
access router, the router decrypts the packet and computes the
ICV of the packet for authentication. These operations incur
the second part of overhead for our protocol.
We evaluate the performance of our protocol for packets of
size 1000 bytes. The total overhead of our protocol is calcu-
lated and listed in table III. As seen from the table, the total
overhead of our protocol takes up only 3.8% for the 450MHz
Pentium III and 2.9% for the 2.1GHz Pentium IV of the total
time. Therefore, our protocol can be used to secure wireless
communications with degrading the performance slightly.
TABLE III
OVERHEAD OF OUR PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS NETWORKS
450MHz P III 2.1GHz P IV
Overhead/Session 53.0ms/8.4ms 1 19.6ms/8.4ms
Overhead/Packet 0.08ms/0.16ms 0.04ms/0.16ms
Total Overhead 2 (61.4+0.24·n)ms (28.0+0.20·n)ms
Total Overhead 3 3.8% 2.9%
1The data is in form of computation/transmission time.
2The total overhead for n-packet transmission.
3The total overhead of a 1000-packet session as a percentage of the total time.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Security issues are crucial for wireless communications, and
a secure and efficient access control mechanism is the first
line of defense for secure wireless networking. In this paper
we reviewed existing access control schemes for wireless
networks, and identified their weaknesses and drawbacks.
Then we proposed a new access control protocol that meets
all the security requirements of wireless networks: mutual
authentication, key confirmation, perfect forward secrecy, se-
curity against dictionary attacks, DoS resistance, and client
identity confidentiality. We also present the security analysis
and performance evaluation for our protocol, which show that
our protocol is both secure and efficient for access control in
wireless networks.
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